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DELIBERATIVE ENGAGEMENT WITHIN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
A FUNCTIONAL SUBSTITUTE FOR
AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
COSETTE D. CREAMER & ZUZANNA GODZIMIRSKA*
The transition from the General Agreement on Tanffs and Trade
(GA TT) dispute settlement proceedings to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism
(DSM) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) represented a notable in-
stance ofjudicialization within international economic governance. Since it
began ruling on trade conflicts in 1995, the DSM has enjoyed significantly
greater independence from direct government control than its GATT prede-
cessors. It has also exercised a greater degree of interpretive autonomy than
initially intended by WTO member governments ("Members"). This develop-
ment largely stems from deadlock among Members and norms of consensus
decision-making, which have thwarted use of one of the primary means of
legislative response within the WTO: authoritative interpretations. Authori-
tative interpretations theoretically provide the WTO's political bodies-the
membership as a whole-with an opportunity to respond to interpretations
or practices of its adjudicative bodies that are perceived to be at odds with
governments' intention, will, or preferences. Yet the current ineffective na-
ture of authoritative interpretations creates a predicament not only for the
WTO's political organs. It also deprives the DSM of constructive normative
guidance from its primary constituents: its Members. This Article proposes a
functional substitute for the mechanism of authoritative interpretations,
namely increased input from Members (in the form of statements within
meetings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body) prior to adoption of the dis-
pute settlement rulings. We argue that such an increase would better enable
the DSM to consider the interpretive preferences of the WTO membership as a
whole, thus enabling it to better fulfill its fiduciary duties and its responsi-
bility of deliberative engagement with Members in particular. This Article
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specifies how the proposal would work in practice and addresses potential
limitations and obstacles to its implementation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, governments have increasingly
granted international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies the au-
thority to interpret legal agreements, resolve disputes, or en-
force international rules. This trend has historically been and
continues to be a puzzling one for international legal scholars
and government officials trained to guard zealously the
boundaries of state sovereignty. Many assume that states can
exercise sufficient control over these tribunals or exit the re-
gime if membership costs begin to outweigh benefits.' Al-
though delegating authority to an international body is con-
troversial and raises a number of concerns about sovereignty,
legitimacy, and accountability,2 international courts also clarify
1. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner &John C. Yoo, judicial Independence in Interna-
tional Tribunals, 93 CA. L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing that international tribu-
nals cannot, and should not, be completely independent and should act in
line with the interests of the states that created them).
2. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, The Structural Con-
stitution, and Non-Self Execution, 55 STANFORD L. REv. 1557 (2003) (assessing
some of the constitutional implications of United States' delegations of au-
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obligations, help states overcome cooperation problems, and
contribute more generally to the development of an interna-
tional legal system.3 Perhaps for this reason, states continue to
create formally independent tribunals, particularly in the area
of international economic law.
In the context of international trade, scholars and practi-
tioners have cautioned about a growing institutional imbal-
ance within the World Trade Organization (WTO) between its
political and quasijudicial bodies.4 The Organization's adjudi-
cative bodies consist of dispute settlement panels and the Ap-
pellate Body, together referred to as the Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DSM) of the Organization.5 The rulings of the
thority to international institutions, including international courts); Thomas
M. Franck, Can the United States Delegate Aspects of Sovereignty to International
Regimes?, in DELEGATING STATE PowERs: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON
DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY 1-2 (Thomas M. Franck, ed., 2000) (describing
the "intense criticism" directed at the lack of democratic accountability in
many international regimes); Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and
State Sovereignty, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115 (2008) (addressing concerns
about state sovereignty when delegating authority to international institu-
tions); Julian G. Ku, International Delegation and the New World Court Order, 81
WASH. L. REv. 1 (2006) (presenting a comprehensive constitutional critique
of U.S. domestic courts' enforcement of international tribunals' decisions);
David A. Lake, Delegating Divisible Sovereignty: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefreld, 2
REV. INT'L ORG. 219 (2007) (reviewing the sources of controversy and criti-
cism over delegating authority to international organizations); Armin von
Bodgandy, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Courts: A Conceptual Frame-
work, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 361 (2013) (providing a conceptual framework
to address the issue of democracy and democratic legitimacy of international
courts).
3. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An
Investigation of International Courts'Public Authority and Its Democratic Justifica-
tion, 23 EUR.J. INT'L L. 7, 8 (2012) (noting that international courts are "part
of strategies that pursue shared aims, seek to overcome obstacles of coopera-
tion, and try to mend failures of collective action").
4. See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative
Interpretation Under Article XL2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization: Current Law, Practice and Possible Improvements, 8 J. INT'L EcON. L.
803, 815 (2005).
5. In this Article we refer to the WTO dispute settlement panels and the
Appellate Body as comprising together "the Dispute Settlement Mechanism"
(DSM), "the adjudicative bodies," or "the quasi-judicial bodies" of the WTO.
Panels consist of experts selected on an ad hoc basis to resolve disputes be-
tween WTO Members, while the Appellate Body is a permanent body re-
sponsible for reviewing the legal aspects of panel reports if and when those
are appealed. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
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DSM are subject to adoption by the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), a political body comprised of all Member representa-
tives. The norm that all decisions adopted within the political
bodies of the WTO-including the DSB-should be reached
by consensus has led to a political decision-making stalemate.
At the same time, the scope of the adjudicative bodies' exer-
cise of authority has grown through its rulings. Despite in-
creased concern over this institutional imbalance, WTO mem-
ber governments ("Members") have made few noticeable ef-
forts to tackle the challenges that ineffective mechanisms of
political response create for the Membership in the face of the
adjudicative bodies' increased autonomy.6 This Article pro-
poses a functional substitute for existing modes of legislative
response within the WTO, which should prove useful to both
WTO Members and its adjudicative bodies.
During the Uruguay Round negotiations establishing the
WTO, states parties agreed to create an overarching institu-
tional framework to transform the decentralized General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system into a formal
international organization. While negotiating states did voice
sovereignty concerns about the implications of moving from
the GATT to a formal organizational model, ultimately these
concerns did not prevail.7 Under the WTO's more institution-
alized framework for negotiations and decision-making, Mem-
ment of Disputes arts. 16-17, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter
DSU].
6. On the tensions between the political and adjudicative bodies of the
WTO, see generally Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Tensions Between the Dispute Set-
tlement Process and the Diplomatic and Treaty-Making Activities of the WTO, I
WORLD TRADE REv. 301 (2002) (arguing that the political decision-making
process, compared to the strong dispute settlement process, appears weak
and inefficient because it is defacto governed by the principle of consensus,
creating a troubling imbalance within the Organization); John H. Jackson,
The WTO 'Constitution' and Proposed Reforms: Seven 'Mantras'Revisited, 4J. INT'L
ECON. L. 67, 73 (2001) (suggesting that if the decision- and rule-making
processes are ineffective, Members might be inclined to resort to dispute
settlement, leading the dispute settlement system to "take on issues that it
ought not to"); Armin von Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO-Strategies
to Cope with a Deficient Relationship, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 609, 614-
625 (2001).
7. See ERNST H. PREEG, TRADERS IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD: THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 122-26, 207-
10 (providing an overview of Uruguay Round negotiations over the creation
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 48:413416
DELIBERATIVE ENGAGEMENT
bers serve various functions on councils and committees,
which constitute the WTO's political-and in some sense legis-
lative-bodies.8 In fact, the WTO describes itself as "member-
driven" and both Member representatives and WTO officials
repeat this phrase as a self-affirming mantra.9 Members thus
view themselves as the primary constituents of the Organiza-
tion as a whole and of its dispute settlement system in particu-
lar.
The transition from the GATT dispute settlement pro-
ceedings to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM)
represented a notable instance of judicialization within inter-
national economic governance, in that it significantly in-
creased the independence of the DSM from direct Member
control.' 0 Negotiating states intended to maintain a political
check on the WTO's newly created adjudicative bodies but in
practice the DSM enjoys interpretive autonomy. The General
Council sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), a politi-
cal organ consisting of WTO Member representatives, formally
adopts dispute reports and issues implementation recommen-
dations under a reverse consensus rule,'I but the primary re-
of an organizational form and noting the concerns voiced by the United
States delegate in particular).
8. Disagreement persists over whether and how to analogize domestic
legal structures to international organizations, but a fair bit of existing schol-
arship presumes that the political bodies of the WTO perform what can be
characterized as a legislative function. See, e.g., Bogdandy, supra note 6, at
614 (pointing out that the WTO Agreement establishes a separation of pow-
ers within the WTO system between the legislative, executive, and adjudica-
tive branches); MARY E. FOOTER, AN INSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 26 (2006); Gregory Schaffer & Joel
Trachtman, Interpretation and Iustitutional Choice at the WNTO, I O4ATI Socio-
LEGAL SERIES 1 (2011).
9. FoOTER, supra note 8, at 28; WTO Info. & External Relations Div.,
Understanding the WTO 101 (2011).
10. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the
World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System
Since 1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1157 at 1215 (1994) (referring, inter
alia, to the fact that panel and Appellate Body reports are adopted unless
disapproved by consensus as indicative of increased independence of the
WTO DSM compared to dispute settlement proceedings under the GATT).
11. The primary political body of the WTO-the General Council
(GC)-handles the day-to-day work of the organization, including adminis-
tration of the DSM when sitting as the DSB. Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, art. IV, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. The general rule within the DSB is to
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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sponsibility for clarifying provisions within the WTO covered
agreements rests with the adjudicative bodies of the Organiza-
tion, i.e. dispute panels and the Appellate Body (AB).' 2 Be-
cause nearly every decision taken by the WTO's political bod-
ies requires consensus of all Members, the ability of govern-
ments, individually or collectively, to provide formal guidance
to or influence over the DSM through established treaty mech-
anisms has become a near impossibility.' 3 This poses a prob-
lem for Members, but also represents a significant challenge
for the DSM, which depends on feedback from the member-
ship as a whole to fulfill its fiduciary duties to its stakeholders.
This structural relationship between the WTO's member-
ship and its adjudicative bodies reflects a pervasive tension be-
tween judicial independence and political control and ties
into the scholarly debate over whether to best characterize in-
ternational judicial bodies as agents or trustees of their mem-
bers.' 4 A growing scholarly consensus views the DSM as a trus-
take decisions by consensus. However, for establishment of a panel, adop-
tion of panel and Appellate Body reports, and authorization of retaliation,
the DSU provides that the DSB must adopt the decision unless there is a
consensus against it. DSU arts. 6.1, 16.4, 17.5, 22.6. This decision-making
procedure is referred to as negative or reverse consensus. FOOTER, supra
note 8, at 143.
12. Although interpretations and findings developed within reports of
the DSM only bind parties in the context of a specific dispute, many argue
that a type of de facto stare decisis operates within the W%7TO. See, e.g.,
Zhu Lanye, The Effects of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body
Reports: Is the Dispute Settlement Body Resolving Specific Disputes Only or Making
Precedent at the Same Time?, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 221 (2003); Alec
Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Trustee Courts and the Judicialization ofInter-
national Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention
on Human Rights, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, I J. L.
& CTS. 61, 82 (2013) (arguing that the Appellate Body interprets and applies
WTO agreements through "de facto adherence to precedent").
13. See, e.g., Ehlermann, supra note 6, at 302, 304 (arguing that the grow-
ing number of WTO Members will slow the political decision-making process
even further).
14. See generally Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in
their Political Context, 14 EuR.J. INT'l. REL. 33 (2008) [hereinafter Alter, Agents
or Trustees] (arguing that delegation to trustees is inherently different from
delegation to agents, and that international courts such as the WTO DSM
are more accurately categorized as trustees); Karen J. Alter, The Multiple Roles
of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitu-
tional and Administrative Review, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECfVES ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL REIATIONs 345 (Jeffrey Dunoff et al. eds.,
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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tee-type judicial body in that (1) it possesses compulsory juris-
diction, (2) it acts as the authoritative interpreter of WTO law,
and (3) it issues decisions which are "virtually impossible" for
Members to reverse.15 Some even characterize the DSM as a
type of "super-agent" in exercising its delegated authority to
enforce WTO rules against its Members.16 Whether one views
the DSM as a trustee or an agent of Members, the key issue
underlying both approaches concerns the constituency of an
international court: who the court is set up to serve and to
whom the DSM owes a responsibility under a fiduciary theory
of judging. As the actors who have delegated authority and
powers to the DSM and whose interests the DSM is entrusted
2013) [hereinafter Alter, Multiple Roles] (describing four roles that states
have delegated to the international courts they create); CliffordJ. Carrubba,
Matthew Gabel & Charles Han kla, Judicial Behavior Under Political Constraints:
Evidence from the European Court ofJustice, 102 Am. POL. SCI. REv. 435 (2008)
(providing empirical evidence contributing to the debate over how strongly
member-state governments influence European Court ofJustice rulings);Ja-
cob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J.
INr't, L. 411 (2008) (assessing the effectiveness of various types of control
mechanisms available to states to influence the international courts they cre-
ate); Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & MichaelJ. Tier-
ney, Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-
Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3
(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) (adopting a principal-agent approach
to theorize when and how states delegate authority to international organiza-
tions); Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary
Relations in EU Governance, 2 EUR. UNION POL. 103 (2001) (describing the
principal-agent and fiduciary (trustee) modes of delegation in the context of
the European Union); Sweet & Brunell, supra note 12 (describing the WTO
Appellate Body as a trustee court and examining how it engages in
majoritarian activism to help mitigate legitimacy problems).
15. Sweet & Brunell, supra note 12, at 81-85; see also Alter, Agents or Trust-
ees, supra note 14, at 38-43. But see Manfred Elsig, Principal-Agent Theory and
the World Trade Organization: Complex Agency and Missing Delegation', 17 EUR.J.
INr'L REL. 495 (2011) (conceptualizing the WTO as a complex agent using a
principal-agent framework); Manfred Elsig & Mark A. Pollack, Agents, Trust-
ees, and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial Appointment at the World
Trade Organization, 0 EUR.J. INT'L REL. 1 (2012) (arguing that the Appellate
Body appointment process is deeply politicized, contrary to views of the Ap-
pellate Body as a trustee-type court largely beyond the influence of Mem-
bers).
16. Sweet & Brunell, supra note 12, at 62.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2016] 419
1N7ERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
to serve, the WTO membership as a whole represents the
DSM's beneficiaries, to whom it owes fiduciary duties.' 7
Under a fiduciary theory ofjudging-for courts character-
ized as either agents or trustees-judges have four fundamen-
tal duties: loyalty, care, the cluster of duties including candor,
disclosure, and accounting, and, finally, the duty of delibera-
tive engagement.' 8 This Article focuses on the fourth responsi-
bility of judges-deliberative engagement-as applied to the
WTO's adjudicative bodies. Deliberative engagement refers to
the "affirmative duty" a court has to engage in a type of dia-
logue with those whose interests it holds in trust."' This does
not refer to a literal dialogue but rather to "being genuinely
open to beneficiary preferences" and to provide reasoned de-
cisions in response. 20 Transferred to the WTO context, a fidu-
ciary theory of judging implies that the DSM should seek to
uncover the interests and preferences of a representative sam-
ple of the WTO membership or risk breaching obligations to
its beneficiaries.
While the DSM possesses considerable interpretive au-
thority and autonomy, the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh Agreement) pro-
vides for two mechanisms through which DSM adjudicators
17. Id. at 63, 67 (discussing Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Scr-
ota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 720 (2013)).
18. Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 17, at 731. The advantage of a view
of the judicial role grounded in fiduciary theory rests with its ability to move
beyond the debate over whether courts are better characterized as agents or
trustees, in that both categories are effectively types of fiduciaries. See
Majone, supra note 14, for additional discussion of this debate. Whether a
given court can be characterized as an agent or trustee will be a context-
dependent question. Rather than focusing on this characterization, a fiduci-
ary theory ofjudging allows us to elaborate upon and address the diverse-
and oftentimes conflicting-responsibilities ofjudges. See generally, Evan Fox-
Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN's L. J. 259
(2005) (developing a fiduciary theory of state authority based on the nature
of the relationship between a state and its subjects); Ethanj. Leib, David L.
Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126
HARv. L. REV. 91 (2013) (arguing for and outlining the translation of private
law principles of fiduciary duties to the public law context). For a critique of
theories ofjudicial review that borrow from private law concepts of fiduciary
relationships, see Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1145 (2014).
19. Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 17, at 740.
20. Id. at 741, 744.
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may become apprised of Members' interpretive preferences at
a given moment in time. These mechanisms of legislative feed-
back or response include amendment of the covered agree-
ments2 1 and adoption of authoritative interpretations.22 Mem-
bers thus formally possess the ability to specify what the law is
or should be when they unanimously disagree with interpreta-
tions developed by the DSM, as well as in situations where
WTO rules are unclear or permit multiple interpretations.
However, these formal means of legislative response are diffi-
cult-if not impossible-to employ in practice.23 The adjudi-
cative bodies are thus left without any effective counterbal-
ance, raising the question of how the DSM may properly assess
common interpretive views among Members in order to fulfill
its fiduciary duty of deliberative engagement.
21. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 11, art. X.
22. Id. art. IX:2. Although waivers under article IX:3 and art. IX:4 of the
Marrakesh Agreement permit a Member to depart from an existing WTO
obligation for a limited period of time, their purpose and effects differ from
the formal mechanisms of legislative response discussed herein. First, waivers
are intended to be temporary measures with limited duration and without
lasting legal effect. Second, while a waiver does relieve a Member from a
particular WTO obligation, it is "exceptional in nature, subject to strict disci-
plines and should be interpreted with great care," and thus cannot be taken
as direct evidence of Members' views on the interpretation of WTO obliga-
tions or a "subsequent agreement" in the sense of art. 31(3) (a) of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Appellate Body Report, European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Sec-
ond Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador, ¶ 382, WT/DS27/AB/RW2
(Nov. 26 2008); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by the United States, 11 380, 390, WT/DS27/AB/RW (Nov. 26 2008). Still, the
WTO membership has sometimes used waivers in situations where a multilat-
eral interpretation "could ... have been more suitable," i.e. the so-called
Kimberly Waiver granted in 2003. Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 4, at 815.
The right to issue authoritative interpretations, also referred to as "Article
IX:2 interpretations," endows Members with a tool to fill in interpretive gaps
or ambiguities. Article IX:2 assigns the exclusive right to adopt authoritative
interpretations to the highest political organs within the WATO-the Ministe-
rial Conference (MC) or the GC-with adoption requiring a three-fourths
majority, though consensus would likely be required in practice. See further,
infra note 44 and accompanying text; Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 4, at
805-06.
23. See generally Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 4, at 813-18 (surveying
various attempts to initiate the application of these formal means of legisla-
tive responses).
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Trade officials and scholars recognized the difficulty
posed by the DSM's lack of an effective mechanism for deliber-
ative engagement nearly a decade ago, when WTO Director
General Supachai Panitchpakdi convened a Consultative
Board to examine and address institutional challenges faced
by the system.2 4 The resulting Sutherland Report on The Future
of the WTO suggested that the DSB should play a "more con-
structive role ... with respect to criticisms ofjurisprudence." 25
While many of the reform proposals contained within the
Sutherland Report had the potential to address the growing
institutional imbalance within the WTO and to enable the
DSM to fulfill its fiduciary duties, nearly ten years later Mem-
bers have made no significant efforts to turn these proposals
into a reality. 2 6
The DSM's inability to fulfill its duty of deliberate engage-
ment with the full membership stems partly from the fact that
only the interpretive views of parties and third parties pleaded
during the course of dispute proceedings officially reach the
DSM. 27 This implies that dispute panels and the AB are formu-
lating interpretations of WTO rules based on incomplete in-
formation about all of the Members' preferences, as only a
handful of Members have participated in disputes before the
DSM. 28 Accordingly, although it remains to be studied empiri-
cally, the DSM's interpretations are likely biased in favor of a
24. See Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General
Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Chal-
lenges in the New Millenium, 49-59 (2005) [hereinafter the Sutherland Report]
(providing an appraisal and recommendations for improvement of the WATO
Dispute Settlement System); see also Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 4, at
820 (noting that the approach should not be abused as that would expose
the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body to review and harm the Appellate
Body's independence).
25. Sutherland Report, supra note 24, 1 250.
26. William J. Davey, The WTO and Rules-Based Dispute Settlement: Historical
Evolution, Operational Success, and Future Challenges, 17 J. INT'L ECON. L. 679,
693 (2014) [hereinafter Davey, Rules-Based Dispute Settlement] (discussing this
concern within the Sutherland Report and noting a decade later that there
was still "a need for some way for the political system to ensure that the
negotiated rules are appropriately interpreted").
27. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and
WTO Dispute Settlement, 58 WORLD Poi.. 446 (2006) (finding that panel and
Appellate Body decisions appear to be influenced by third party participa-
tion).
28. See infra Table 1.
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powerful minority: the handful of economically and politically
influential countries that participate actively within the dispute
settlement system. 29 An existing practice within the DSB-the
expression of views prior to the adoption of panel and AB re-
ports-could address this deficiency.30 Government represent-
atives can and often do use these statements both to express
views on the reports and to address systemic issues and
broader jurisprudential developments.
DSB statements in no way legally bind the WTO's quasi-
judicial bodies, particularly given that Members often voice
widely divergent views on the same issue. Rather, they fulfill an
important informational function, in that they make interpre-
tive preferences of Members available for consideration by the
DSM. However, an unrepresentative subset of countries make
statements in this context,31 which suggests that the DSM is
only fulfilling its duty of deliberative engagement (to consider
its beneficiaries' preferences) with respect to a minority of
Members. In order to remedy this and to assist the WTO's ad-
judicative bodies in fulfilling their delegated role, this Article
outlines how Members can improve the normative guidance
received by the DSM by adopting a more widespread and for-
ward-looking practice of expressing views before the DSB
adopts panel or AB reports. This will encourage less active
countries within the dispute settlement system to familiarize
themselves with WTO rules and jurisprudence and, more im-
portantly, improve the functioning of the DSM by aiding its
duty to fulfill its fiduciary obligations to all Members.
This Article proceeds as follows: Following this introduc-
tion, Section II outlines the formal mechanisms of legislative
response available to Members under the WTO Agreement,
focusing on Members' exclusive right to adopt authoritative
interpretations. It examines the few unsuccessful efforts to
adopt such interpretations and discusses how the non-use of
Article IX:2 contributes to an institutional imbalance between
29. See Henrik Horn, Louise Johannesson & Petros C. Mavroidis, The
WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2010: Some Descriptive Statistics, 45 J. WORID
TRADE 1107 (2011) (providing an overview of the countries that use the dis-
pute settlement system).
30. Prior to the adoption of reports by the DSB, any Member representa-
tive retains the right to make statements on their record that "express their
views on a . . . report." DSU, supra note 5, arts 16.4, 17.14.
31. See infra Table 3.
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the WTO's political and adjudicative bodies not intended by
Members when drafting the WTO Agreement. We then
demonstrate how Members may functionally circumvent this
inability to engage in legislative response, by providing norma-
tive guidance to the WTO's adjudicative organs through their
DSB statements on panel and AB reports. Drawing on an origi-
nal dataset of all report statements made within the DSB from
1995 to 2012 and a series of interviews with Member represent-
atives and WTO Secretariat officials,32 Section III examines the
use of this informal mechanism to date. It demonstrates that
Members that express report views do not constitute a repre-
sentative sample of the WTO membership as a whole, along
critical and relevant characteristics. This suggests that report
statements currently provide panels and the AB with a skewed
picture of the membership's views on certain jurisprudential
developments. In order to remedy this, Section IV proposes
that a broader range of Members actively formulate and ex-
press views, individually or jointly, prior to report adoption.
This section also addresses potential obstacles to or limitations
of this proposal. Section V concludes by briefly discussing why
this proposal is normatively desirable at this time.
II. LEGISLATIvE RESPONSE WITHIN THE WTO
The WTO relies on a decentralized form of enforcement,
with governments challenging other Members' domestic laws
and policies within the dispute settlement system. Member
governments formally adopt dispute rulings and issue imple-
mentation recommendations under a "reverse consensus"
rule,33 but the primary responsibility for clarifying WTO rules
and interpreting the scope of international trade authority
32. A total of twenty-nine interviews were conducted during 13-17Janu-
ary 2014 in Geneva, Switzerland. Three interviewees were officials within the
WATO Secretariat; twenty-five interviews were conducted with current or for-
mer delegates representing their respective Members within DSB meetings;
one interview was conducted with a representative from the Advisory Centre
on WTO Law, an independent organization that provides legal advice and
assistance to developing and least-developed countries. Members inter-
viewed varied across relevant characteristics, including size, wealth, use of
the dispute settlement system, and vocal participation within meetings of the
DSB. The identities of all interviewees have been redacted and replaced with
random numbers, to ensure interviewee confidentiality.
33. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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rests with panels and the Appellate Body. Member govern-
ments are bound by these decisions, face retaliatory conces-
sions if they do not comply with their rulings, and as a result,
most governments do eventually make costly changes to do-
mestic laws and regulations to bring their measures into com-
pliance. 3 4
Under the WTO Agreement, Members possess two mech-
anisms of legislative response to interpretations articulated by
the DSM: Article X amendments of the covered agreements
and Article IX:2 authoritative interpretations. In this Article,
"legislative response" refers to the response of the WTO's po-
litical bodies-the membership as a whole-to interpretations
or practices of its adjudicative bodies that are perceived to be
at odds with governments' intention, will, or preferences.35
Within the domestic context, mechanisms of legislative re-
sponse play a similarly important role in ensuring accountabil-
ity between branches of government and minimizing the
"countermajoritarian difficulty" of unaccountable judges over-
ruling the "will of the legislature." 3 6 Reversals of interpreta-
34. For discussions of rates of compliance with DSM rulings, see gener-
ally William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 17 (2005) (finding that although performance in terms of
compliance with time frames has been quite unimpressive, the DSM has
overall been successful in settling disputes); Davey, Rules-Based Dispute Settle-
ment, supra note 26 (assessing the effectiveness of the DSS, and, in particular,
compliance with decisions by the major trade WTO powers, the U.S., EU
and China); Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 397 (2007)
(arguing that compliance rates with DSM rulings are overall high, and that
the U.S. and the EU, despite some difficulties, generally have succeeded in
complying with panel and Appellate Body decisions). But see William J. Da-
vey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 119
(2009) (examining problems related to the quality and timeliness of compli-
ance and proposing reforms to tackle them).
35. See generally RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE
MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE PoLITics OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOsEV~iLT TO REA-
GAN 34 (1990) (providing an overview of scholarship in the American con-
text that focuses on the ongoing interaction among "separated institutions
sharing power"); see also Jeb Barnes, Bringing the Courts Back In: Interbranch
Perspectives on the Role of Courts in American Politics and Policymaking, 10 ANN.
REv. Pot. Sci. 25 (2007) (reviewing studies in the American context that
approach the study of courts from an "interbranch perspective" and poli-
cymaking as emanating from interaction among overlapping forums).
36. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLITIcs 16 (2d ed. 1962). See alsoJonN H. ELY, DE-
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tions do not occur on a daily basis at the domestic level, but
the availability of legislative response does provide an impor-
tant mechanism to secure a majoritarian check on what the
law is or should be.
While the domestic model is not directly transposable to
the international level, where a decentralized system is recog-
nized and accepted,37 legislative response still provides a use-
ful reference point to ensure proper functioning of an institu-
tion. More importantly, it likely enhances the quality and rep-
resentativeness of decision making undertaken by various
branches by encouraging a continuing and dynamic "dia-
logue" over the meaning of the law.38 Even the strongest sup-
porters of the juridification of the multilateral trading system
have not advocated for relinquishing all political or diplomatic
input into the activities of the DSM.39 Given the WTO's ambi-
tion to function as a Member-driven organization and to facili-
tate cooperative international economic relations, it is just as
important as in the domestic context that governments make
use of the WTO Agreement's legislative response mechanisms
to provide normative guidance to the adjudicative bodies
tasked with clarifying WTO rules and facilitating the resolu-
tion of trade disputes.
MOCRACY AND DISTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 4-5 (1980) (pointing
to concerns over (domestic) courts' overruling the lawmaking branches' de-
cisions, in that courts are not elected by the people or are not otherwise
politically accountable); William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpreta-
tion 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1525 (1987) (citing Guino CAIABRESI, A COM-
MON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)) (arguing that even in the do-
mestic context, "legislative inertia" often leaves the "countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty unsolved, but ameliorated").
37. Dominic Raab & Hans Bevers, The International Criminal Court and the
Separation of Powers, 3 INT'L ORG. L. REv. 93, 98 (2006).
38. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577,
654 (1993) (describing how American judicial decisions frame dialogues
about the law); Raab & Bevers, supra note 37, at 133 (noting how newly es-
tablished working groups are helping to enhance dialogue between the ICC
and States Parties). See generally Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES:
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988) (arguing that constitutional
interpretation and development emerges from a dialogue among the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of government).
39. See, e.g., Robert L. Howse, The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate
Body furisprudence on the Nature and Limits of the Judicial Power, in THE RoLE OF
THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGUlATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS
FOR THE WATO 11 (Thomas Cottier et al., eds., 2003).
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The power to adopt Article X amendments represents a
clear ability to re-contract, since amendments may add to, al-
ter, or diminish existing rights and obligations. 40 The proce-
dures for amending the various WTO agreements are fairly
complex and differ according to the agreement and provision
at issue.4 1 In practice, the amendment procedure does not
make for an efficient mechanism of legislative response, as the
process is understandably lengthy.4 2 For example, the first
treaty amendment agreed upon by WTO Members-the Pro-
tocol Amending the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights adopted in 2005-is not currently
in effect, with two thirds of the WTO's Members yet to for-
mally deposit an instrument of acceptance with the Director
General. 43
The right to issue Article IX:2 interpretations endows
Members with a more practical tool to implicitly re-contract,
not by altering existing rights or obligations but by filling in
interpretive gaps or ambiguities.44 This provides governments
with the authority to shape future dispute settlement jurispru-
40. Members may seek an amendment for reasons other than legislative
response, such as to address time-inconsistent preferences on international
trade or in response to changes in the uncertain environment of interna-
tional economic relations. See Barbara Koremenos, Contracting Around Inter-
national Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 549 (2005).
41. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 11, art. X (outlining the various
procedures for amending WTO agreements and provisions).
42. See Hunter Nottage & Thomas Sebastian, Giving Legal Effect to the Re-
sults of WTO Trade Negotiations: An Analysis of the Methods of Changing W4TO
Law, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 989, 991-94 (2006) (detailing the cumbersome
amendment process, including the various procedural obstacles that delay
amendments, and limited application of amendments that normally only
take effect for members who have accepted them).
43. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement: Decision of 6 De-
cember 2005, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005); WTO, Members Accepting Amendment of
the TRIPS Agreement (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/
trips e/amendmente.htm (providing a list of Members that have deposited
instruments of acceptance with the WITO's Director General).
44. The Appellate Body has noted that an art. IX:2 interpretation is
"meant to clarify the meaning of existing obligations, not to modify their
content" and "can be likened to a subsequent agreement regarding the in-
terpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions pursuant to Arti-
cle 31(3) (a) of the Vienna Convention, as far as the interpretation of the WTO
agreements is concerned." Appellate Body Report, European Communities-
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Second Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador, supra note 22, at 11 350, 383.
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dence if it begins to move away from WTO Members' interpre-
tive preferences. Article IX:2 assigns the exclusive right to
adopt authoritative interpretations to the Ministerial Confer-
ence or the General Council (GC), with adoption requiring a
three-fourths majority, though consensus would likely be re-
quired in practice.4 5 While the WTO Agreement does not
specify their legal effects, the AB has noted that such interpre-
tations have "a pervasive legal effect" and are "binding on all
Members," and therefore on panels and the AB as well. 46 This
is one of the fundamental differences between Article IX:2 in-
terpretations and interpretations undertaken by the DSM in
the course of dispute settlement, which only formally bind the
parties to a given dispute.4 7 Article IX:2 thus grants WTO
Members an opportunity to refine and shape the interpreta-
tion of existing rules, with the effect of determining the scope
of rules prospectively as well as correcting future applications
of interpretations contained within adopted reports.
Articles IX:2 and X of the WTO Agreement encourage a
type of deliberative engagement between Members and the
DSM bodies. This is particularly important given the difficulty
(if not impossibility) of blocking report adoption, due to the
reverse consensus rule. Because reports of panels and the AB
have significant political and economic implications for the
membership as a whole, the ability of Members to respond to
their decisions encourages a dialogical relationship with the
DSM about Members' rights and obligations under the cov-
ered agreements.
Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization
almost twenty years ago, Members have made a few efforts to
employ Article IX:2 interpretations but none have been
adopted to date. On 21 January 1999, the European Commu-
nities (EC) requested an authoritative interpretation regard-
ing the relationship between Articles 21.5 and 22 of the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and called for a special
meeting of the GC to consider this "sequencing issue."4 8 The
45. Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 4, at 804-05.
46. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Production
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 1 250, WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012).
47. Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico, 66 n. 308, HT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008).
48. Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article IX:2
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
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GC did not adopt the requested interpretation, with the Chair-
man instead suggesting that the DSB consider the issue.49
Three years later, several countries proposed that the GC
adopt an Article IX:2 interpretation on Article 30 of the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Agreement.50 Ultimately, Members first made use of a waiver5 '
and subsequently formally amended the treaty.5 2 A few govern-
ments within the DSU Review negotiations have suggested em-
ploying authoritative interpretations to clarify certain aspects
of the DSU and provide normative guidance to the DSM re-
garding, inter alia, discretionary law theory, the sequencing is-
sue, and provisions affecting developing countries, though to
date no authoritative interpretations have been adopted. 3
Communication from the European Communities, WT/GC/W/133 (Jan. 25,
1999); Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article IX:2
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Communication from the European Communities, WT/GC/W/143 (Feb. 5 1999).
The United States opposed the request, arguing that the proposed interpre-
tation would effectively be an amendment and thus would contradict the
prohibition on undermining the amendment procedure. See Response to
European Communities' Request for an Authoritative Interpretation of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding Pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement, Communication from the United States, 3, WT/GC/W/144 (Feb. 5,
1999).
49. Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 15 and
16 February 1999, at 30, ¶ 6(a), WT/GC/M/35 (Mar. 30, 1999).
50. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Concept Paper Relating to Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agree-
ment and Public Health, Communication from the European Communities and their
member States, it 23-31, IP/C/W/339 (Mar. 4, 2002); Council for Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 11 6-13, IP/C/W/355
(June 24, 2002); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Proposals on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health: Thematic Compilation, 13, 16, IP/C/W/363 (July 11, 2002).
51. Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agree-
ment and Public Health, Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, WT/
L/540 and Corr. I (Sept. 1, 2003).
52. Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement: Decision of 6 December 2005,
WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005).
53. See, e.g., Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations
on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 3, TN/
DS/W/22 (Oct. 28, 2002) (proposition by Japan to "make an exception to
the application of the 'discretionary law' theory when repetition of the same
violation is highly probable"); Special Session of the Dispute Settlement
Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 21 May 2002, 1 29, TN/DS/M/2 (July 3,
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Similarly, WTO Members have not employed Article IX:2
interpretations in instances where we might have expected re-
sponses to jurisprudential developments disfavored by the ma-
jority of Members. For example, when panels and the AB be-
gan accepting unsolicited amicus curiae briefs, Members
merely criticized the practice during the course of a GC meet-
ing.54 In Australia-Automotive Leather II,M the Article 21.5
compliance panel's interpretation of "withdraw the subsidy"
under Article 4.7 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures (SCM) likewise elicited strong criticism from
a large number of Members,5 6 but no authoritative interpreta-
tion was sought. One likely explanation for the non-use of au-
thoritative interpretations is the WTO's customary practice of
consensus decision-making. While Members may be able to
2002) (noting Bulgaria's interest in cooperating with other parties on find-
ing a solution to the sequencing issue); Special Session of the Dispute Settle-
ment Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 15July 2002, 1 8, TN/DS/M/3 (Sept.
9, 2002) (noting Bulgaria's interest in resolving the problem of sequencing
through an authoritative interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
DSU); Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes ofMeeting held
on 10 September 2002, ¶ 56, TN/DS/M/4 (Nov. 6, 2002) (noting the proposal
from Kenya on behalf of the African Group for the benefit of all developing
countries calling for an authoritative interpretation of the DSU to allow for
strengthening the technical assistance programs, collective retaliation, em-
ploying the use of special procedures relating to resource constraints in ad-
dition to time-frames, and making legal expertise available); Special Session
of the Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 14 October 2002, ¶
12, TN/DS/M/5 (Feb. 27, 2003) (noting Japan's proposal to create an ex-
ception to the application of the "discretionary law" theory when repetition
of the same violation was highly probable through an authoritative interpre-
tation of Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO);
Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 13-
15 November 2002, 1 3, TN/DS/M/6 (Mar. 31, 2003) (noting Japan's belief
that abuse of the "discretionary law" theory was a real possibility requiring a
resolution and supporting the use of an authoritative interpretation of Arti-
cle XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO to amend the
relevant WTO provisions and create an exception to the "discretionary law"
theory).
54. Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 22 November
2000, ¶¶ 16, 22, 31, 40, 49, 70, 83, 89, 98, 112, WT/GC/M/60 Uan. 23,
2001).
55. Panel Report, Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of
Automotive Leather- recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the US, WT/DS126/
RW (Jan. 21, 2000).
56. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William
Rappard on 11 February 2000, pp. 5-9, WT/DSB/M/75 (Mar. 7, 2000).
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agree on what constitutes an incorrect interpretation, this
does not necessarily imply they would be able to reach a con-
sensus on the appropriate authoritative interpretation to
adopt.
Given the non-use of Article XI:2, the DSM essentially en-
joys complete interpretive autonomy from the political bodies
of the Organization. This has led some to observe that the po-
litical decision-making process of the WTO appears "weak and
inefficient" compared to its dispute settlement process57 and
that the non-use of authoritative interpretations has been "un-
comfortable for the dispute settlement system, notably the AB,
who is aware that mistakes or disapproved legal interpretations
will not be corrected."5 8 The non-use of legislative response
mechanisms within the WTO has effectively given decisions of
the AB "a kind of de facto finality as interpretations of law,
even if they lack de jure finality."5 9
The practice of consensus decision-making within the
WTO has raised some concerns about the institutional balance
between the Organization's political and adjudicative bodies,
leading to multiple reform proposals over the years. In Decem-
ber 2002, Chile and the United States (U.S.) issued ajoint pro-
posal in the context of DSU Review negotiations to address
Member concerns that "some limitations in the current proce-
dures may have resulted, in some cases, in an interpretative
approach or legal reasoning applied by WTO adjudicative bod-
ies . . . that could have benefitted from additional Member
review."6 0 They suggested that Members might provide addi-
tional interpretive guidance through, among other mecha-
nisms, the "partial adoption" of reports.6 ' Although controver-
sial among Members, the proposal did garner some support
57. Ehlermann, supra note 6, at 302.
58. Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 4, at 819.
59. Howse, supra note 39, at 15. Panels have made clear that they will
follow the Appellate Body's prior interpretations unless confronted with "co-
gent" reasons to reach a different conclusion, which would include an art.
IX:2 interpretation. See Panel Report, United States-Countervailing and Anti-
Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, ¶ 7.317, WT/DS449/R
(Mar. 27, 2014).
60. Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Im-
provements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving
Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement, Communication by Chile
and the United States 1 2, TN/DS/W/28 (Dec. 23, 2002).
61. Id. at ¶ 6(c).
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and remains on the agenda of DSU Review discussions.6 2 More
critically, it clearly reflects a concern that interpretations
within dispute reports are difficult if not impossible to change
through legislative response by the Members. Others have pro-
posed to make authoritative interpretations more operational
in practice, to provide both Members and the adjudicative
bodies "normative guidance in the context of ambiguous
rules, instead of resorting to dispute settlement."63 While a
laudable goal, it is highly unlikely that this mechanism, which
to date has never been employed, will ever function as envi-
sioned by the founders of the WTO.
Although it is debatable and far beyond the scope of this
Article to assess whether the non-use of legislative response
weakens the DSM's legitimacy, the fact that the WTO's adjudi-
cative bodies are left with few systematic or efficient feedback
mechanisms is worrisome from a normative perspective.64
62. World Trade Organization, Annual Report 2013, 32 (2013) (indicating
that Member-control and flexibility, including whether to allow deletion of
parts of panel reports by parties, were still under discussion during DSU ne-
gotiations in 2013). Subsequent Annual Reports of the WTO do not specifi-
cally refer to the issue of "partial adoption," but emphasize that "[f]urther
work is .. . ongoing on flexibility and member-control." World Trade Organ-
ization, Annual Report 2014, 38 (2014)). Support for this proposal came pri-
marily from Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. See THOMAS A. ZIMMER-
MANN, NEGOTIATING THE REVIEW OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLIEMENT UNDER-
STANDING 116 (2006). India and Jordan also expressed early tentative
support for the proposal. See Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body,
Minutes of Meeting held on 28-30january 2003, 11 12, 15, TN/DS/M/8 (June
30, 2003). In addition, some Members expressed support for this proposal
within interviews. See, e.g., Interview 5.5, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 17, 2014).
For opposition to this proposal, see Daniel Pruzin, US. Proposal on Dispute
Settlement Reform Gets Mixed Reaction from WTO Delegations, WTO REPORTER
(Dec. 20 2002), http://news.bna.com/wtln/WTLNWB/split display.adp?
fedfid=9297363&vname=wtobulallissues&fcn=2&wsn=520450000&fn=92973
63&split=0; US-Chile Text For DSU Changes Leaves Out Standard of Review, INSIDE
US TRADE, Mar. 14, 2003. One interviewee indicated that his country sup-
ported increased flexibility, but expressly noted the lack of consensus within
the membership to adopt the proposal. See Interview 4.7, in Geneva, Switz.
(Jan. 16, 2014).
63. Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 4, at 813.
64. While it could be argued that interim review does provide an effi-
cient feedback mechanism, it is limited to the parties' preferences and does
not shed light on the preferences of the membership as a whole. Third-party
participation within disputes could potentially contribute to enhancing the
representativeness of views made available to the DSM, but interviews re-
vealed that many third parties find it difficult to actively participate in pro-
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Members' non-use of authoritative interpretations raises the
question of how the DSM can assess common interpretive
views or practices among all WTO Members. To put it differ-
ently, non-use of formal legislative response leaves unspecified
the means through which the membership as a whole and the
DSM do and should engage in deliberative engagement. In or-
der to address this shortcoming, we argue that Members
should increase reliance on an existing practice-the expres-
sion of views prior to adoption of panel and Appellate Body
reports within DSB meetings-as a functional substitute for
formal legislative response. The legal effects of these two
mechanisms-authoritative interpretations and expression of
views-differ significantly, in that the former bind future dis-
pute settlement proceedings while the latter do not. However,
both tools fulfill the underlying goal of providing to the DSM
feedback, guidance, and information on Members' interpre-
tive preferences.
III. EXPRESSION OF VIEWS PRIOR TO REPORT ADOPTION:
CURRENT PRACTICES
The WTO Agreement formally provides Members with
the ability to shape interpretation of the covered agreements
through Article XI:2, but this mechanism is not utilized in
practice and there is considerable reason to doubt it will ever
operate effectively. Yet its intended function-legislative re-
sponse-is an important one. From both an institutional and a
normative perspective it is critical that the DSM be aware of
interpretive views held by a representative cross-section of the
WTO membership. Declarations adopted and views expressed
by governments within the WTO's various committees provide
one indirect way in which the DSM could become apprised of
Members' views on the meaning or interpretation of provi-
sions within covered agreements. 65 These may be helpful
ceedings and are often, due to capacity constraints, relegated to passive ob-
servers. See, e.g., Interview 2.1, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 14, 2014); Interview
5.5, supra note 62.
65. See Schaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 15. For instances in which
the DSM has referred to the views of WTO committees, see, for example,
Panel Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast
Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, Il 7.100, 7.321, WT/DS219/R (Mar. 7,
2003); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on
Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, ¶ 80, n.73, WT/DS219/AB/
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when considering provisions not previously interpreted, but
are less informative in terms of providing a systematic way for
the DSM to assess Member consensus or dissensus over inter-
pretations already articulated.
We argue that views expressed in statements made prior
to report adoption within the DSB have the potential to fulfill
this function. These views could provide the DSM with a
wealth of information about Members' interpretive prefer-
ences to which it can refer, if it so chooses, in future disputes.
This section describes the current practice of views expressed
on reports in the WTO, drawing on an original dataset of state-
ments made within meetings of the DSB between 1995 and
2012 and a series of interviews with Member representatives
and WTO Secretariat officials. It highlights the current defi-
ciencies in and limitations on the use of report statements to
date, before turning to proposals for improving the practice to
enable the DSM to better fulfill its fiduciary duty of delibera-
tive engagement with Members.
A. Procedure and Purpose of Statements on Dispute Reports
Panels and the Appellate Body report their findings di-
rectly to Members in plenary sessions of the General Council
sitting as the DSB. These reports do not directly bind parties to
the dispute, but must be adopted by the DSB, which then is-
sues implementation recommendations that create the sec-
ond-order legal obligations in terms of compliance. 66 While
the DSU does not expressly create a right for government rep-
resentatives to express report views, it does provide that the
report adoption procedure is "without prejudice to the right
of Members to express their views." 67 In practice this has taken
the form of statements by interested governments made on
the record of a DSB meeting, following which the report is
adopted under the reverse consensus rule.68 Panel reports
must be adopted or appealed within sixty days of their date of
circulation; if one or more parties decide to appeal the report,
R (July 22, 2003) (relying on a recommendation issued by the Anti-Dumping
Committee to interpret the requirement of an investigation period within
anti-dumping investigations).
66. DSU arts. 19, 21.1.
67. Id. arts. 16.4, 17.14.
68. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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they typically postpone its consideration by the DSB until the
conclusion of the appellate proceeding.69 For this reason,
many panel reports have not been discussed by the DSB sepa-
rate from their consideration prior to adoption of the AB re-
port.
Members have engaged in little explicit discussion of the
purpose of statements made prior to report adoption. Most
invariably stress that the right to make report statements does
not undermine parties' unconditional acceptance of adopted
report findings.7 0 Some have noted that such views "may fur-
nish cogent reasons that would ultimately lead to further clari-
fication of the issues in question," 7 ' and that such discussion is
critical in terms of providing structured feedback "in the inter-
est of the long-term viability and health of the dispute settle-
ment system."7 2 Within interviews, several representatives simi-
larly noted that the right to make report statements provides
an opportunity for the membership to inform the Secretariat
and ultimately the AB about its views on both jurisprudence
and the conduct of dispute proceedings.7 3 The expression of
report views thus serves a similar purpose to that of Article
IX:2 authoritative interpretations, in that both create a feed-
back mechanism to assist the DSM in ascertaining and assess-
ing Members' interpretive preferences. They differ signifi-
cantly in that, unlike Article IX:2 interpretations, Members' re-
port statements are not legally binding upon other Members,
panels, or the AB.74 In this difference, however, lies the
strength of this mechanism in fulfilling its proposed informa-
69. Bozena Mueller-Holyst, The Role of the Dispute Settlement Body in the Dis-
pute Settlement Process, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST
TEN YEARs 25, 27 (Rufus Yerxa et al., eds., 2005).
70. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 1 August
2008, 11 71-88, WT/DSB/M/254 (Oct. 22, 2008).
71. Id. ¶ 76.
72. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 23 May 1997, at 5-
10, WT/DSB/M/33 (une 25, 1997).
73. Interview 1.1, in Geneva, Switz. (an. 13, 2014); Interview 2.4, in Ge-
neva, Switz. (an. 14, 2014); Interview 5.5, supra note 62.
74. Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Suspension of Obliga-
tions in the EC Hormones Dispute, ¶¶ 398-99, WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16,
2008) (noting that "DSB statements are not intended to have legal effects
and do not have the legal status of a definitive determination in themselves.
Rather, they are views expressed by Members and should not be considered
to prejudice Members' position in the context of a dispute").
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tional role. Precisely because such statements are not legally
binding, Members may be less restrained in elaborating on
their interpretive views than when attempting to reach consen-
sus in order to adopt an authoritative interpretation.
B. Overview of Report Statement Practices
While the WTO Agreement permits all Members to ex-
press report views, in practice only a select group of govern-
ments make use of this opportunity and even these do not
make full use of its potential to act as a constructive feedback
mechanism. Between 1995 and 2012, the DSB has considered
and adopted 169 reports (see Table 1), with an average of 9.39
reports adopted per year. Members have made a total of 1,038
statements expressing views on these reports (11.3 per cent of
all statements made within DSB meetings), with an average of
6.14 statements made per report and an average of 5.57 Mem-
bers expressing views prior to report adoption. On very rare
occasions, parties to the dispute also circulate written report
statements.7 5 Overall, only thirty-nine per cent of the WTO
membership in 2012 (fifty-one Members in total) has ex-
pressed at least one view on an AB report, with the percentage
even smaller for panel or Article 21.5 reports.7 6
75. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Communication by Mexico, United
States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS162/8 (July, 26, 2000) (written
statement by Mexico expressing its "deep concern . .. with regard to the
handling of the Panel Report in United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916").
76. Percentage of membership calculated excluding all EU member
states, as only the EU representative may express views or make statements
within the DSB. See Interview 1.2, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 13, 2014); Interview
1.3, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 13, 2014).
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TABLE 1: WTO Dispute Reports Adopted, 1995-2012**
Reports Total Report Average % Members
Adopted Statements Statements Represented*
per Report
Panel Reports 49 221 4.43 27%
(36 Members)
Appellate Body 92 641 6.97 39%
& Panel (51 Members)
Reports
Art. 21.5 28 180 6.43 24%
Reports (31 Members)
GATT, GATS 32 210 6.56 27%
(36 Members)
ADA, SCM, 61 350 5.74 25%
TBT (33 Members)
All other 48 298 6.21 33%
Agreements (43 Members)
*Percentage of Members Represented calculated excluding all E.U. member
states. Figures on agreement type calculated only for panel and Appellate
Body reports (excluding Art. 21.5 reports).
**Source: Authors' dataset of all statements made within the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body from 1995-2012. Minutes of DSB meetings obtained from
the WTO's Documents Online system.
Members express fewer total views on panel reports than
AB or Article 21.5 compliance proceeding reports, although
views expressed on AB reports do often reference panel find-
ings. The average number of statements does not differ con-
siderably across the trade agreement(s) interpreted within the
report. This pattern is consistent across time and contingent
on the type of disputes empaneled. Reports interpreting
newer disciplines do not elicit significantly more statements
than those interpreting agreements with fairly established pre-
WTO jurisprudence (such as the GATT). This suggests that
Members do not presently use these statements as an explicit
means to provide views on newly interpreted provisions, for
which the DSM might benefit from additional guidance on
governments' interpretive preferences.
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C. Trends in the Use of Report Statements
Participation within DSB meetings varies across Members
in predictable ways, since not all countries are active users of
the dispute settlement system and many often do not have a
direct interest in DSB agenda items. Larger countries and the
most frequent users of the dispute system attend every meeting
of the DSB, while smaller or not very active ones will send a
representative when convenient.77 The majority of report
statements have been made by the most active users of the dis-
pute system, with the U.S. and the European Union (EU) (for-
merly EC) the most vocal in absolute terms (see Table 2).
Among newer Members, those that participate in more dis-
putes (either as a party or a third party) are slowly increasing
their expression of views prior to report adoption. Examples
include China, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia. Tellingly, only two
Members that have never participated in any empaneled dis-
pute (either as a party or a third party) have expressed a view
prior to report adoption.78 Controlling for empaneled dispute
participation reveals a different picture, with the less frequent
users of the system relatively more vocal. For example, Malay-
sia is by far the most vocal Member relative to its participation
as a party or third party. While frequent users of the system
deliver more report statements in absolute terms, they are not
necessarily more willing to express views when not directly in-
volved in a dispute.
77. Interview 2.1, supra note 64.
78. Prior to adoption of the Appellate Body and panel reports in United
States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (WT/ DS176/AB/R;
WT/DS176/R), Haiti issued a brief statement praising the Appellate Body's
findings and supporting Cuba's position. See Dispute Settlement Body, Min-
utes of Meeting hetd on I February 2002, 1 34, WT/DSB/M/119 (Mar. 6, 2002).
Prior to adoption of the Appellate Body and panel reports in European Com-
munities-Trade Description of Sardines (WT/DS231/AB/R; WT/DS231/R),
Morocco expressed its frustration with its inability to defend its interests as a
third-party and its resort to submission of an amicus curiae brief as an alter-
native procedure. See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 23
October 2002, 11 67-68, WT/DSB/M/134 (Jan. 29, 2003).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 48:413438
DELIBERATIVE ENGAGEMENT
TABLE 2: MEMBER PARTICIPATION WITHIN THE
DisPuTE SETTLEMENT BODY**
Member Member Member
Rank (Total Report (Report Statements (Report Statements by
Statements) by Years Member) Dispute Participation)*
1 USA USA Malaysia
(169) (8.90) (6.5)
2 European Union European Union Hong Kong, China
(150) (7.90) (3.33)
3 Canada Canada Antigua and Barbuda
(69) (3.63) (2)
4 Japan Japan Philippines
(57) (3) (1.64)
5 India India Egypt
(53) (2.79) (1.25)
6 Brazil Brazil Panama
(49) (2.58) (1.14)
7 Australia Australia Costa Rica
(46) (2.42) (1.13)
8 Mexico Mexico Indonesia
(44) (2.32) (1)
9 Hong Kong, China Hong Kong, China Cameroon
(40) (2.11) (1)
10 Republic of Korea China Hungary
(36) (1.92) (1)
11 Argentina Republic of Korea Poland
(34) (1.90) (1)
12 China Argentina Switzerland
(25) (1.79) (1)
13 Chile Chile Saint Lucia
(24) (1.26) (1)
14 Thailand Thailand Ecuador
(20) (1.05) (0.94)
15 Norway Norway USA
(19) (1) (0.93)
16 Philippines Philippines European Union
(18) (0.95) (0.90)
17 Costa Rica Costa Rica Argentina
(17) (0.90) (0.85)
18 Ecuador Ecuador Chile
(16) (0.89) (0.83)
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19 Malaysia Malaysia Canada
(13) (0.68) (0.78)
20 Guatemala Guatemala Cote d'Ivoire
(12) (0.63) (0.75)
*Rankings for Report Statements by Dispute Participation calculated by nor-
malizing total report statements with the number of individual empaneled
disputes in which a Member participated as a party or third-party.
**Source: Authors' dataset of all statements made within the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body from 1995-2012. Minutes of DSB meetings obtained from
the WTO's Documents Online system.
The subset of Members that have made at least two report
statements differs considerably from the WTO membership as
a whole, along a number of relevant characteristics (see Table
3). First, wealthier countries tend to express report views. The
average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita for speak-
ing Members is nearly twice as large as the average for the
membership as a whole.79 Second, the average share of inter-
national trade in GDP for vocal governments is slightly lower (-
7.32 per cent) than for the membership as a whole. This mea-
sure proxies the importance of international trade within
countries, with international trade typically more important
for small countries with lower levels of economic self-suffi-
ciency. Third, larger countries are disproportionately expres-
sing views, with the average total population of speaking Mem-
bers 2.5 times that of the membership as a whole. However,
vocal governments are broadly representative of the total
membership in terms of level of urbanization. Fourth, more
powerful countries tend to express report views more fre-
quently, with average military expenditure and size for vocal
Members over twice that of the averages for the membership
as a whole."o Finally, the average level of democracy for speak-
79. Panel data for GDP per capita (current USD), international trade as
a percentage of GDP, total population and urban population (percent of
total population) obtained from the World Bank's World Development In-
dicators databank, available at http://databank.worldbank.org/ (last visited
Mar. 8, 2014).
80. Panel data for Military Expenditure and Military Personnel obtained
from the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities (v4.0) data set, ac-
cessed 8 March 2014. J. David Singer, Reconstructing the Correlates of War
Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 14 INT'L INTERACTIONS 115 (1988)
(describing the content, sources and coding of variables contained within
the data set).
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ing governments is almost twice that of the membership as a
whole.8 ' These differences clearly demonstrate that the coun-
tries making report statements are not representative of the
entire WTO membership in terms of wealth, trade depen-
dency, size, power or degree of domestic democratic govern-
ance.
TABLE 3: REPRESENTATIVENESS OF MEMBERS THAT
ExPREss REPORT VIEWS**
Members that Entire WTO Difference in
have made >1 Membership Mean
report statement
GDP per capita 26,864.60 13,259.88 +13,604.72
(current USD)
Share of 79.56 86.88 -7.32
International
Trade in GDP (%)
Total Population 115,310,578.3 46,251,507.6 +69,059,070.7
Urban Population 62.46 51.66 +10.8
(% of total)
Military 19,630,728.4 7,355,902.92 +12,274,825.48
Expenditure
(thousands of
current USD)
Military Personnel 262.76 112.00 150.76
(thousands)
Polity IV score 6.199 3.350 +2.849
**Data Sources: Data for GDP per capita (current USD), international trade
as a percentage of GDP, total population, and urban population (percentage
of total population) obtained from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators databank, available at: http://databank.worldbank.org. Data for
Military Expenditure and Military Personnel obtained from the Correlates of
War National Military Capabilities (v4.0) data set, available at: www.corre
latesofwar.org. Polity IV data obtained from: www.systemicpeace.org/polity/
polity4.htm.
Note: Averages calculated for all Members during years as a WTO Member
only (where data available). Averages calculated excluding all EU member
states. For the European Union, averages for GDP per capita, total popula-
tion, military expenditure and military personnel calculated by summing EU
81. Panel data for level of democracy obtained from the Polity IV Project.
Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr & Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012 (June 6, 2014), http://www
.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
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member state averages; EU averages for share of international trade in GDP,
urban population and Polity IV score calculated by averaging EU members
states averages.
D. Content of Report Statements
Parties have extensive opportunities to develop their legal
arguments within written and oral submissions and during the
interim review stage, yet it is 'almost customary' for parties to
make a statement prior to report adoption.8 2 To date all have
done so, with one exception.8 3 Parties to a dispute have made
almost half (46.5 per cent) of all report statements, although
third parties also regularly express views (34.1 per cent of all
report statements). Third party expression of views has de-
creased slightly from the early years of the WTO's dispute set-
tlement system, a trend that some Member delegates have
noted,8 4 but the difference is not substantial. Although the av-
erage number of third parties per dispute has grown steadily
over the years, the percentage of third parties to a dispute ex-
pressing views has not declined significantly (see Figure 1).
Third parties are more willing to express views on AB and Arti-
cle 21.5 compliance decisions than on panel reports, though
statements on AB reports typically discuss the panel findings as
well. Members not party or third party (the "non-parties") to a
dispute have made 19.4 per cent of total report statements,
and express views primarily on decisions of the AB and not
panel or Article 21.5 decisions.
82. Interview 1.3, supra note 76.
83. Prior to adoption of the Appellate Body and panel reports in Mexico
- Taxes on Soft Drinks WT/DS308/AB/R (March 6, 2006) and WT/DS308/
R (March 6, 2006), Mexico did not express a view. See Dispute Settlement
Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 24 March 2006, 11 1-11, WT/DSB/M/208
(April 28, 2006) (containing minutes of the DSB meeting in which the re-
ports in Mexico - Taxes on Soft Drinks were adopted by the DSB, during
which only the United States, a party to the dispute, and the European Com-
munities, a third party made statements and Mexico did not make a state-
ment prior to report adoption).
84. Interview 5.5, supra note 62.
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FIGURE 1: THIRD PARTY EXPRESSION OF REPORT VIEWS
SOURCE: Authors' dataset of all statements made within the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body from 1995-2012. Minutes of DSB meetings obtained from
the WTO's Documents Online system.
Overall, third parties and non-parties are much more cau-
tious about expressing views on the record. Some worry that
the statement may be "used against [them] at a later stage."8 5
For this reason, many typically reserve report statements for
procedural and systemic issues.8 6 A number of government
representatives indicated that statements by third or non-par-
ties could be particularly valuable in terms of providing "more
neutral feedback to the Secretariat."8 7 As discussed further be-
low, the ability to express a substantive view on a report re-
quires the legal capacity and resources necessary to analyze its
systemic legal implications. Participation as a third party may
be one method to develop such capacity,8 8 and not surpris-
85. Interview 1.1, supra note 73; Interview 1.3, supra note 76.
86. Interview 1.3, supra note 76; Interview 2.4, supra note 73; Interview
3.2, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 15, 2014).
87. Interview 1.1, supra note 73.
88. See Christina L. Davis & Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, Who Files? Developing
Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication, 71 J. Po.. 1033, 1036-38
(2009) (discussing three countries that have demonstrated how experience
in litigation promotes learning and reduces startup costs for subsequent liti-
gation); Interview 1.4, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 13, 2014).
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ingly countries that regularly participate as third parties are
also more likely to express report views in general. Only three
governments have issued report statements without ever hav-
ing participated as a third party in a dispute: Antigua and Bar-
buda, Haiti, and Morocco.8 In addition, the average number
of report statements for Members that have participated in
more than ten disputes is more than seven times that for Mem-
bers having participated in less than ten.
The substance of a report statement understandably var-
ies according to whether the Member was a party to the case,
had a direct economic interest in the dispute, or whether the
report addressed issues with potential implications for future
disputes. Report views can roughly be placed into three cate-
gories: (1) those that focus on the merits of the report findings
in that particular dispute;'oo (2) those that note findings, inter-
pretations or procedural decisions adopted within a report
and highlight their implications for future disputes, the system
as a whole or broader interpretive consistency;9' and (3) those
that merely take note of an interpretation or finding, in order
to flag it as an issue deserving further consideration, without
adopting a substantive view.9 2 A Member might express all
89. Morocco's statement was related to a dispute in which it had at-
tempted to participate as a third party but had missed the deadline to do so.
Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes ofMeeting held on 23 October 2002, 11 67-68,
WT/DSB/M/134 (Jan. 29, 2003). Antigua and Barbuda's statements related
to a dispute in which it was the complainant.
90. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 15 July
2011, ¶¶ 2-4, WT/DSB/M299 (Sept. 1, 2011) (expressing support of the
Philippines, a party to the Thailand-Cigarettes (Philippines) (WT/DS371/
AB/R; WT/DS371/R) dispute, with the Reports and emphasizing that the
Reports had given clear guidance as to the contents of the disputed rules).
91. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 23 March
2012, ¶ 76, WT/DSB/M/313 (May 29, 2012) (expressing views of Canada (a
third party to US-Large Civil Aircrafi (Second Complaint) (WT/DS353/AB/R;
WT/DS353/R) dispute) on two interpretive issues with systemic implications
found within the Reports: the causal analysis required to support a panel
finding that subsidies caused serious prejudice and the scope of the specific-
ity analysis under art 2.1(a) of the SCM Agreement).
92. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 6 Novem-
ber 1998, at 13, WT/DSB/M/50 (Dec. 14, 1998) (noting prior to adoption of
the Appellate Body and panel reports in US-Shrimps (WT/DS58/AB/R;
WT/DS58/R) Australia's recognition that "[t]he Appellate Body's finding
had pointed to some important aspects of these tests which deserved further
consideration").
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three types of views within one statement, though parties
largely focus on the first category while third and non-parties
tend to highlight the second. Parties to a dispute typically reit-
erate legal arguments made within their submissions and high-
light particular report findings or procedural aspects with
which they strongly agree or disagree. Third and non-parties
generally limit their comments to specific findings or procedu-
ral issues that raise systemic concerns or that might affect their
interests in the future. For the most part, these statements are
shorter than those of parties, though there are exceptions.
Third parties are more vocal regarding politically or eco-
nomically sensitive disputes. For instance, in the EC-Bananas
III dispute, a number of third parties had direct economic in-
terests in its resolution and were correspondingly vocal during
report adoption.93 Adoption of the panel report in US-Section
301 Trade Act,'9 4 regarding the controversial U.S. legislation
permitting unilateral authorization of trade sanctions, gener-
ated the largest number of third party statements on any one
report to date (twelve in total) and a significant number of
non-party statements (six in total).95
Reports for which non-parties express views are those that
raise systemic or procedural issues of concern to the member-
ship as a whole. For example, prior to the adoption of the AB
report in US-Lead and Bismuth II, 96 sixteen non-party govern-
ments expressed views (the largest number of non-party state-
ments made on a report to date). All sixteen of these state-
93. For example, prior to the adoption of the Appellate Body and Panel
Reports in European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribu-
tion of Bananas (WT/DS27/AB/R; WT/DS27/R/ECU; WT/DS27/R/GTM;
WT/DS27/R/HND; WT/DS27/R/MEX; WT/DS27/R/USA), eight third
parties and two non-parties issued statements. Dispute Settlement Body, Min-
utes of Meeting held on 25 September 1997, at 14-25, WT/DSB/M/37 (Nov. 4,
1997).
94. Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
95. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting held on 27 January
2000, 11 10-20, WT/DSB/M/74 (Feb. 22, 2000).
96. Appellate Body Report, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Du-
ties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Orginating in
the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000).
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ments discussed the AB's decision to accept and consider ami-
cus curiae submissions in that dispute."
The tone of views expressed understandably varies across
reports, with some representatives noting that because panel
reports do not have the same authority as those issued by the
AB, Members are slightly more critical towards the former. For
third parties or non-parties in particular, expression of views
might represent the only chance "to make a statement and
voice criticism against a report." 8 The tone of views also ap-
pears to vary across Members. Some interviewees noted appar-
ent differences in tone between the EU and the U.S. in partic-
ular, in that the U.S. is more willing to voice overt criticism of
AB interpretations while the EU exhibits greater reluctance to
express strong disapproval.9" A key word analysis of EU and
U.S. report statements tentatively supports this observation,
with the EU expressing relatively more "satisfaction" within its
statements than the U.S. 100 Some interviewees suggested that
differences in Members' willingness to express overt disap-
proval within report statements relates to cultural differences
and different attitudes about the proper role of international
adjudicative bodies." 1 While the personality of the individual
delivering the oral statement may partly impact perceived
tone, the influence of individual characteristics is likely mini-
mal, as most of these statements are drafted prior to the DSB
meeting and must be approved by the Member's capital.
E. Current Use of Report Statements to Communicate
with the DSM
To a certain extent, Members already use report state-
ments to provide interpretive feedback to the WTO's adjudica-
tive bodies. A few smaller or less active delegations firmly
97. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 7June 2000, WT/
DSB/M/83 (July 7, 2000) (all statements during the DSB meeting con-
cerned the report in US-Lead and Bismuth II).
98. Interview 1.3, supra note 76.
99. Id.; Interview 2.4, supra note 73.
100. Using the program WordSmith (Scott, M., 2012, WordSmith Tools
version 6, Stroud: Lexical Analysis Software) this analysis found that the EU
employed the term "satisfaction" within statements more often than would
be expected by chance in comparison with U.S. report statements.
101. Interview 2.2, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 14, 2014); Interview 2.3, in Ge-
neva, Switz. (Jan. 14, 2014).
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averred that the Secretariat or AB members were not the in-
tended audiences of such statements,1 0 2 but a number of rep-
resentatives indicated that the primary intended audience for
report statements is the system as a whole (the Legal Affairs
Division of the Secretariat, panelists, the AB, and the Appellate
Body Secretariat). The purpose of these statements is to place
on the official record a government's views on legal interpreta-
tions or procedural decisions.' 0 3 Some representatives noted
that report statements can "pass a message" to the Secretariat
or panelists in future disputes, particularly with respect to pro-
cedural issues. 0 4
A couple of the most active Members-particularly those
that stressed the independence of the AB and the authorita-
tiveness of their reports-did not see any value in regularly
expressing criticism of a report's reasoning or findings, and
indicated they only voice a critical statement to signal that the
issue raised is of considerable importance.' 5 Almost all repre-
sentatives independently employed the language of "sending
messages" to the AB or Secretariat, emphasizing that report
statements "do have a systemic value for the legitimacy of the
institution," 0 6 though the strength of the signal might depend
on how many Members expressed or supported the same
view.' 0 7 As one representative phrased it:
If [the panel or the Appellate Body] makes a decision
that was too daring, and nobody says anything, they
will think they got it right. But if twenty countries, or
fifteen, or even ten-but in very strong words-come
and criticize, and go into the legal details, [the Secre-
tariat or the Appellate Body members] will discuss it
internally. Because perhaps they got it right legally,
but politically they may have gotten it wrong.108
A number of representatives also believe that the Secreta-
riat's Legal Affairs Division and the Appellate Body Secretariat
102. Interview 3.2, supra note 86; Interview 4.5, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 16,
2014).
103. Interview 3.4, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 15, 2014); Interview 5.5, supra
note 62; Interview 5.6, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 17, 2014).
104. Interview 1.3, supra note 76; Interview 5.5, supra note 62.
105. Interview 1.3, supra note 76; Interview 2.2, supra note 101.
106. Interview 2.4, supra note 73.
107. Interview 5.5, supra note 62.
108. Id.
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are paying attention to their report views. 0 9 Representatives
from the Legal Affairs Division of the Secretariat and the Ap-
pellate Body Secretariat sit in on DSB meetings, and interviews
with WTO officials confirmed that these two bodies pay partic-
ular attention to systemic and procedural issues raised by
Members in the context of report adoption. 0 As almost all
interviewees emphasized, whether particular views actually in-
fluence or play a decisive role in subsequent decisions is a sep-
arate question. If it does occur at all, such influence is likely
"very subtle" due to the independent authority of the WTO's
adjudicative bodies."'
A search of all adopted reports to date indicates that
panels or the AB have never cited statements made prior to
report adoption, even though they often cite the minutes of
DSB meetings in relation to the procedural history of a dispute
or as indirect evidence of a panel's terms of reference.' 12 We
are not arguing that the panels or AB should begin to cite ex-
pression of views within their reports, but rather that they
should look to such statements as a source of information
about Members' interpretive preferences.
This section provided considerable evidence that expres-
sion of report views does provide a systematic mechanism
through which the WTO membership's interpretive prefer-
ences could be made known to the Organization's adjudicative
bodies. As described above, the use of expression of views
prior to report adoption to date is limited in important re-
spects. The subset of governments that regularly expresses
views is not representative of the distribution of wealth, trade
dependency, size, power or degree of domestic democratic
governance across the membership as a whole. For these rea-
sons, we propose that a broader range of Members actively for-
109. Interview 2.4, supra note 73; Interview 5.1, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 17,
2014); Interview 5.2, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 17, 2014); Interview 5.5, supra
note 62.
110. Interview 2.3, supra note 101.
111. Interview 4.3, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 16, 2014).
112. For example, the panel and the Appellate Body cited extensively to
DSB meeting minutes in the context of US-Large Civil Aircraft (Second Com-
plaint), in order to establish the procedural history regarding requests for
Annex V procedures under the SCM Agreement. See Appellate Body Report,
United States-Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint),
¶¶ 8, 85, 388, 482, 538-39, 541, WT/DS353/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2012).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 48:413448
DELIBERATIVE ENGAGEMENT
mulate and express report views, either individually or jointly.
The following section further elaborates the normative justifi-
cation for this proposal and outlines how it would work in
practice, addressing potential obstacles and limitations to its
implementation.
IV. DELIBERATIVE ENGAGEMENT THROUGH
ExPRESSION OF VIEWS
A. The Duty of Deliberative Engagement in the WTO
As recently outlined by Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet, and
Michael Serota, a fiduciary theory of judging is one that at-
tempts to addresses the diverse-and oftentimes conflicting-
responsibilities of judges." 3 It views the judicial role in terms
of a fiduciary relationship, which is characterized by one actor
(the fiduciary) holding "discretionary power over the practical
interests of another (the beneficiary)."" 4 In the domestic con-
text, citizens represent the beneficiaries of courts to which
they delegate authority over their legal interests. In the inter-
national context, a court's set of beneficiaries differs across in-
stitutions. As mentioned previously, in the context of the
"member-driven" WTO, Members represent the primary con-
stituents and beneficiaries that have delegated authority over
their legal interests to the DSM." 5
Under a fiduciary theory, judges are under an obligation
to engage in deliberative engagement with their beneficiaries.
Skeptics might argue that such engagement in the context of
the WTO could endanger the independence and impartiality
of the DSM's decision-makers. However, the obligation to en-
113. Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 17, at 700.
114. Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 262
(2011).
115. While industry organizations, corporations, consumer interest
groups, and individual citizens may all be affected by trade measures and
panel and Appellate Body reports and thus could be regarded as benefi-
ciaries, their views will often be reflected within and through the expressed
views of WTO Members, either in proceedings or through statements in
meetings of the political bodies of the Organization. The DSU itself indi-
rectly supports the claim that the membership as a whole, in contrast to the
narrow subset of active participants in disputes, constitutes the beneficiaries.
See DSU art. 17(3) (establishing that "the Appellate Body membership shall
be broadly representative of the WTO," presumably so that the AB will
render decisions that reflect the broader membership).
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gage in deliberative engagement does not require that the
DSM always conform its decisions to the preferences of its ben-
eficiaries. Rather, it stipulates that the DSM should consider
these preferences and provide reasoned decisions that in some
way speak to these views or interests. Considerable evidence
suggests that the DSM already pays attention to what is said
within DSB meetings. The current problem is that these views
rarely represent those of the membership as a whole. The duty
of deliberative engagement also needs to be understood in re-
lation to judges' other fiduciary obligations, namely care and
loyalty. While care is meant to ensure reason-based decisions,
the loyalty obligation emphasizes the importance of impartial-
ity, which is the "cornerstone" of a judge's ethical commit-
ment.' 16 Considered in tandem with judges' other obligations,
the duty of deliberative engagement serves to strengthen the
DSM in fulfilling its delegated role in an impartial manner.
The duty of deliberative engagement may further be seen
in relation to the customary rules of interpretation on which
DSU Article 3(2) stipulates the DSM should rely. Article 32 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties"'7 directs the
DSM to look to sources that can shed light on Members' "in-
tention when they accepted a given provision and their under-
standing as to its content."' 18 As a rule of interpretation it en-
courages the DSM to fulfill its duty of deliberative engagement
by actively seeking to uncover beneficiary preferences.I' In a
similar fashion, report statements provide the DSM with sup-
116. See Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 17, at 731 (noting that 'judicial
loyalty and impartiality is the cornerstone of the ethical commitment of
judges, both historically and in the contemporary ethical rules governing
judges"); Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International judges: Evidence from the
European Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. Pot.. Sci. REV. 417, 417 (2008) (dis-
cussing a growing scholarly consensus that impartiality is fundamental for
effective adjudication in international dispute settlement). The WTO simi-
larly emphasizes this obligation within the Working Procedures for Appel-
late Review, Annex II, Rules of Conduct for the DSU. Appellate Body Re-
port, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6 (Aug. 16, 2010).
117. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
118. Tarcisio Gazzini, Can Authoritative Interpretations Under Article IX:2 of
the Agreement Establishing the WTO Modify the Rights and Obligations of Members?,
57 INr's. & Comp. L. Q. 169, 178 (2008).
119. Id.
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plementary information regarding current preferences or un-
derstandings of ambiguous provisions.
While the WTO Agreement strengthened the indepen-
dence of the DSM, by insulating it from the direct Member
control exercised under the GATT, it simultaneously en-
couraged a type of deliberative engagement through interpre-
tive feedback, by creating the two mechanisms of legislative re-
sponse discussed previously: authoritative interpretations and
amendments. Due to the practice of consensus decision-mak-
ing within the WTO, governments have not been able to make
effective use of the mechanism of authoritative interpretation
in particular, depriving the DSM of a critical source of infor-
mation regarding interpretive preferences.
Compounding this imbalance, informal precedent within
the dispute settlement system enables the first movers-active
users of the WTO's system since its inception-to delimit the
range of preferred interpretations actively considered by the
DSM. As parties to the dispute, the most active users not only
possess numerous opportunities to present their legal argu-
ments during the course of proceedings, in practice they also
dominate statements made in the context of subsequent re-
port adoption. Because the majority of views reaching the
DSM represent only a minority of views potentially held by the
WTO membership as a whole, the panels and AB are forced to
operate in an environment of incomplete information regard-
ing Members' interpretive preferences, biased towards a pow-
erful minority.
A strategy of majoritarian activism-issuing judicial inter-
pretations that a majority of (but not necessarily all) Members
might be expected to adopt independently-represents a form
of deliberative engagement that arguably helps international
courts manage increased judicialization and the legitimacy
problems associated with judicial lawmaking. 120 While panels
and the AB do sometimes adopt a strategy of majoritarian ac-
tivism by assessing Article XX GATT defenses against policy
outcomes on which a majority of countries would agree, this
only occurs in a small number of disputes.121 Even if the WTO
AB has occasionally interpreted the law in "ways that were un-
120. Sweet & Brunell, supra note 12, at 64.
121. Id. at 83-85. Sweet & Brunell examined all panel and AB reports that
addressed the respondent government's defensive claims under art. XX
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wanted by powerful actors,"122 the fact that it consistently and
disproportionately receives feedback from a subset of Mem-
bers suggests that their views inevitably inform jurisprudential
developments. In this respect, the DSM is currently unable to
pursue deliberative engagement through anything but a strat-
egy of minority activism, a clearly questionable development.
B. Improving on Current Practices
Given that governments likely will not begin to employ
authoritative interpretations, they should increase their use of
expression of report views within DSB meetings as a functional
substitute. An increase in the proportion of Members making
statements has the potential to address the current imbalance
in the feedback received by the DSM. In particular, govern-
ments should more actively engage in an iterative albeit indi-
rect form of "dialogue" when a report raises issues with poten-
tially systemic implications or procedural matters. A greater
and more representative subset of countries engaging in such
a dialogue would benefit both the adjudicative bodies and the
membership as a whole, and help strengthen the fiduciary re-
lationship.
To address the issue of representativeness, a greater num-
ber of third and non-parties should seek to place their views
on the record. Increasing the number of third and non-party
report views would also lead to a broader focus within state-
ments, as governments not affected directly by a report's find-
ings may focus more on system-wide implications. Presently,
report views tend to reiterate legal positions pleaded during
the dispute, with the winning party typically supporting the re-
port and the losing party voicing unequivocal criticism, some-
times moving from criticism of a specific dispute finding to
challenges to the DSM's authority.1 3 Third or non-parties,
with a relatively more modest stake in the dispute's specific
outcome, have fewer incentives to express narrow views and
(GATT) or art. XV (General Agreement on Trade in Services) between 1995
and 2011, for a total of 22 reports.
122. Alter, Agents or Trustees, supra note 14, at 52.
123. Authors' dataset available on request. See Cosette D. Creamer &
Zuzanna Godzimirska, (De)Legitimation at the WTO Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nism, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (2016) (describing the content, tone, and
sentiment of statements made prior to report adoption).
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for this reason may provide more constructive guidance on
Members' interpretive preferences.
C. Potential Limitations and Obstacles
Increasing the number of views expressed would increase
the length of DSB meetings and place additional resource bur-
dens on many countries, giving rise to a potential tradeoff be-
tween widespread participation and efficiency.124 To address
this, Members could establish a practice of coordinating inter-
pretive preferences prior to DSB meetings and employing
joint statements whenever feasible. Within GC meetings, gov-
ernments often issue joint statements that express views on be-
half of others (10.6 per cent of all statements made within the
General Council between 1995 and 2012). For many of these
statements, representatives speak on behalf of WTO coalitions
or groups formed in the context of negotiations, based on
shared positions or interests. 25 Compared to GC meetings,
however, representatives employ joint statements much less
frequently within DSB meetings (0.8 per cent of all statements
made within the DSB between 1995 and 2012).126
One reason for this difference may be that the DSB is in-
herently more individualistic than the GC, as it focuses on spe-
cific disputes between two (or more) countries, and thus is not
susceptible to coalitional or group statements. Members might
not want to expressly take sides in a dispute by voicing support
for an interpretation that may have benefited one party to the
detriment of the other. For this reason, the idea of interpretive
coalitions in the DSB could be diplomatically or politically un-
tenable to certain governments. However, the practice of joint
statements is still transposable to the DSB, where groups of
countries could come to share common interpretive prefer-
ences. For example, common interpretive preferences
emerged during discussion of the amicus curiae question
124. See Schaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 17.
125. For an overview of coalition groups within negotiations, see WTO,
Groups in the negotiations http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/ddae/nego
tiating-groups-e.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
126. Between 1995 and 2012, Members have issued 74 joint statements
within DSB meetings, many of which expressed concern about another
Member's noncompliance with a DSB ruling. Dataset available on request.
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within DSB and GC meetings in 2000127 and following Hondu-
ras' second panel request in the Australia-Plain Packaging dis-
pute. 28 The practice of forming coalitions within the DSB also
exists in the context of DSU review negotiations, and third par-
ties do occasionally present joint written submissions or oral
statements.' 2" The practice of joint interpretive statements
127. On 7 November 2000 the Appellate Body division hearing the appeal
in EC-Measures affecting asbestos and asbestos-containing products adopted an
additional procedure to deal with amicus curiae briefs from persons other
than the parties or third parties to the dispute. European Communities-Mea-
sures affecting asbestos and asbestos-containing products, Communication from the
Appellate Body, WT/DS135/9 (Nov. 8, 2000). During a DSB meeting, Mem-
bers were informed that a special GC meeting had been convened at the
request of Egypt, on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing Countries,
to discuss the Appellate Body's procedure. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes
of Meeting held on 17 November 2000, 11 126-37, WT/DSB/M/92 (Jan. 15,
2001). During both meetings, and the GC meeting in particular, most Mem-
bers making a statement expressed the view that the approach of the Appel-
late Body was inconsistent with the DSU provisions. Some representatives
even specifically referred to other Members' statements expressing explicit
support for their view on the matter. See, e.g., statement by the representative
of Brazil, stating that he ". . . supported the statement made by Egypt on
behalf of the Informal Group of Developing Countries." General Council,
Minutes of Meeting held on 22 November 2000, ¶ 41, WT/GC/M/60 (Jan. 23,
2001).
128. On 25 September 2013, Honduras submitted a second panel request
ten months after its original panel request. Australia questioned whether this
could be considered the second panel request, subject to automaticity, given
the lengthy period of time between requests. Members engaged in a pro-
tracted debate within the DSB, with 26 Members making a statement. See
Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 25 September 2013, 1¶
4.1-4.68, WT/DSB/M/337 (Jan. 13, 2014). While not occurring within the
context of report adoption, this discussion does demonstrate the existence
of common interpretive preferences and Members' willingness to express
views even if to the detriment of one of the disputing parties.
129. For example, the delegations of Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay de-
cided to present a joint third-party statement in Argentina-Footwear. See
Panel Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, ¶¶
6.1-6.12, WT/DS121/R (June 25, 1999). In EC-Tanff Preferences, Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela presented a joint third-party sub-
mission as the Andean Community, as did the Central American countries of
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. See Panel Report, Euro-
pean Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Taniff Preferences to Developing
Countries, 11 5.1-5.42, 5.63-5.78, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003). In EC-
Sugar Subsidies, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Sugar Supplying
States (Barbados, Belize, Fiji, Guyana, C6te d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Kenya, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Trin-
idad and Tobago) presented both ajoint written submission and ajoint oral
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within the DSB is thus possible and would help mitigate the
potential tradeoff between widespread participation and effi-
ciency. More critically, joint statements would permit smaller
delegations-that often cannot attend every DSB meeting-to
place their interpretive views on the record, as a statement
could be circulated to and agreed upon by the relevant Mem-
bers beforehand.
A potential obstacle to increasing the number and repre-
sentativeness of report views stems from Members' hesitancy to
put their views on the record, for fear of taking sides or be-
cause of uncertain implications for potential future disputes.
This could be addressed if governments understood that the
purpose of these statements would not be to adopt a position
on the substantive dispute resolved within the report, but
rather to consider implications for the jurisprudential develop-
ment of the system as a whole.130 They should also understand
that they would not be formally bound by their interpretive
view in the future, even if placed on the record of a DSB meet-
ing. It is understandable that interpretive preferences of coun-
tries may change over time. Given the relative frequency with
which reports are adopted, compared to the relatively static
mechanism of authoritative interpretations this mechanism
permits Members to update and change their interpretive po-
sitions as their preferences change.
A more serious concern is that many countries, particu-
larly smaller delegations and non-users of the dispute settle-
ment system, simply do not have any interest in expressing a
view prior to report adoption. However, a number of less ac-
tive and smaller delegations indicated that this lack of interest
stemmed largely from lack of expertise and knowledge about
the jurisprudential implications of reports.' 3 ' A number of
presentation. See Panel Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on
Sugar, Il 5.1-5.12, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R (Oct. 15,
2004).
130. Members already express views within DSB meetings that might not
always be well received by others, yet they view this as acceptable so long as
they inform those with whom they disagree beforehand, according to, inter
alia, one of the Member representatives interviewed. Interview 5.6, supra
note 103.
131. Interview 4.8, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 16, 2014). See also Marc L.
Busch, Eric Reinhardt & Gregory Shaffer, Does Legal Capacity Matter? A Survey
of WTO Members, 8 WORLD TRADE REv. 559 (finding that legal capacity has
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Members view the ability to actively express constructive views
as requiring a level of expertise and resources that many do
not possess currently, a limitation faced by both developing
and smaller developed countries.1 -2 Panel and AB reports
often span several hundreds of pages and can address fairly
complex and technical legal, economic and even scientific is-
sues.
In order to address this obstacle, more resourced Mem-
bers could take the lead in organizing working groups to ex-
plain and discuss interpretive issues raised by a report. Similar
to how Members currently lobby for support on other issues
within the DSB,'3 3 one or more Members could hold informal
meetings to help inform smaller, less-resourced Members
about their views on particular interpretations, highlighting
systemic implications. This would, at the very least, allow
smaller Members to formulate slightly more informed posi-
tions regarding a report's interpretations and implications.
Even if these meetings did not lead to a lengthy or in-depth
statement, they would facilitate the ability of many Members to
put on the record support for or disagreement with clarifica-
tions or interpretations voiced by other Members. While hav-
ing more active or resourced Members take the lead in or-
ganizing these working groups could lead to the same unrep-
resentative outcome-with DSB statements only representing
these parties' positions-other resourced Members with differ-
ent interpretive preferences would be incentivized to convene
their own working groups. Although there is a limited amount
of time between the circulation and adoption of a report,
Members could attend more than one working group.1 3 4 Ulti-
the potential to help Members in all aspects of WTO dispute settlement);
Joseph A. Conti, Learning to Dispute: Repeat Participation, Expertise, and Reputa-
tion at the World Trade Organization, 35 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 625, 626-627
(2010) (emphasizing the importance of practical familiarity with legal
processes to repeat players in dispute resolution in general, and the WTO
more specifically); Davis & Bermeo, supra note 88, at 1047 (finding that the
lack of experience may be an important constraint for participation in inter-
national legal bodies).
132. Interview 3.1, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 15, 2014); Interview 4.2, in Ge-
neva, Switz. (Jan. 16, 2014; Interview 4.5, supra note 102; Interview 4.8, supra
note 131.
133. Interview 1.1, supra note 73; Interview 4.8, supra note 131.
134. The DSU provides strict timelines for adoption of a report by the
DSB following its circulation. For an Appellate Body Report, for example,
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mately each Member would retain the right to formulate its
own position, or at the very least obtain a more informed view
when expressing support for other Members' views.
Another option or supplement to such Member-driven
working groups would be to establish neutral support bodies
to provide jurisprudential overviews and analyses of reports for
all Members, similar to U.S. state legislatures' reliance on re-
search agencies to monitor judicial interpretations of stat-
utes.13 5 Such a support function could be provided by non-
governmental organizations or law firms in Geneva with trade
or WTO law expertise, many of which already hold workshops
on particularly important dispute reports. 3 6 Although such
workshops play a critical role in improving Members' under-
standing of the DSM's jurisprudence, they typically occur after
report adoption and are often restricted to selected Mem-
bers. 3 7 If convened prior to report adoption, these meetings
could facilitate the expression of views by smaller or less-
resourced Members within DSB meetings. Alternatively, Mem-
bers could appoint a group of Secretariat officials within the
Legal Affairs Division with the exclusive job of providing neu-
tral summaries of key interpretive developments within re-
ports, thereby fulfilling a role similar to that of legislative re-
search agencies in the domestic context. Although the Legal
Affairs Division is willing to provide legal research and analysis
to individual Members, this is done only if so requested. For
smaller delegations in particular, requesting information
about interpretations contained within reports simply has
lower priority than many other WTO responsibilities. How-
ever, if the Secretariat institutionalized the systematic provi-
sion of (necessarily brief) report overviews, this would provide
the DSB must adopt it within thirty days of its circulation to the Members.
DSU art. 17-18.
135. See Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps
for Legislators and judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1045, 1061-
70 (1991) (providing an overview of the range of mechanisms and institu-
tions established at the state level to monitor judicial interpretations in the
United States).
136. Examples include the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) or the
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), or
law firms such as Sidley Austin LLP. For a description of some of the work-
shops held by ICTSD in conjunction with the WTO and the ACWL, see
http://www.ictsd.org/tags/legal-capacity.
137. Interview 4.1, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 16, 2014).
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less active Members with a critical resource to formulate their
own interpretive preferences. There is no guarantee that rep-
resentatives would review and act on the information con-
tained within dispute report summaries, but its ready availabil-
ity might incentivize governments to undertake such low-cost
risk-averse behavior.
As noted previously, some Members use third party partic-
ipation as a strategy for familiarizing themselves with WTO
rules and jurisprudence and as a form of capacity building.'
One Member that has actively pursued this strategy claimed
that its country now was "in a better position than twenty years
ago when [they] needed someone from the outside to tell
them that there was a problem . . . ." Through experience, he
claimed, they had now "learned how to use the system."'39
More active DSB participation could potentially have the same
type of capacity-building effect, particularly for developing
countries. A number of developing country representatives
suggested that it could do so because "participation helps you
understand certain dynamics . . . . Attending the DSB meet-
ings ... is like being a third party."I 4 01 By engaging in meaning-
ful report discussions, Members that do not currently attend
or express views will improve their experience and thus capac-
ity to participate actively within DSB meetings and potentially
future dispute proceedings.
Stepping outside the text of the WTO Agreement and for-
mal mechanisms of legislative response could be considered
overreaching or meddling with the Organization's judicial
bodies. Yet the DSU does provide Members with the right to
express views, which some Members already use to voice their
interpretive preferences. We are not arguing that report views
should in any way bind future jurisprudence or that panels
and the AB should always follow the interpretive preferences
of a majority of Members-after all the DSM was delegated
independent authority to interpret and clarify the WTO agree-
ments. However, their delegated role is to do so in ways that
help WTO Members achieve the goals of the Organization in
the context of resolving a specific dispute. Interpretive views
provide necessary information to the DSM in its independent
138. Interview 3.4, supra note 103.
139. Interview 5.3, in Geneva, Switz. (Jan. 16, 2014).
140. Interview 4.8, supra note 131.
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development ofjurisprudence, just as the ordinary meaning of
text, the travaux preparatoires of Agreement provisions and
other sources of law do.
V. CONCLUSION
Almost a decade ago, the Sutherland Report on the Future
of the WTO suggested that the DSB could and should play a
"more constructive role" by establishing a special group of ex-
perts to analyze and report on particular dispute findings. 41
The Report further proposed that the DSB could adopt these
expert reports or use them to recommend an Article IX:2 au-
thoritative interpretation. While the Sutherland proposal had
the potential of overcoming many of the challenges addressed
in this Article, almost ten years later there have been no no-
ticeable efforts to bring it to life.
Time has come for a renewed effort to address the grow-
ing institutional imbalance within the WTO and better enable
the DSM to fulfill its fiduciary duties. To this end, this Article
has sought to develop a proposal that should prove useful to
both WTO Members and the DSM. Drawing on the strengths
of previous proposals but addressing their current shortcom-
ings, we encourage more Members to adopt an active and for-
ward-looking practice of expressing views in the context of re-
port adoption within DSB meetings. This proposal has a real
chance of succeeding due to the fact that it is rooted in indi-
vidual practices of Members, a large number of which desire
to make the DSB more useful in terms of providing construc-
tive feedback to the panels and Appellate Body. Given that the
Organization is comprised of 162 Members, with different and
often conflicting interests, the ability to reach the requisite
consensus for an authoritative interpretation is limited. Our
proposal has the potential to circumvent this decision-making
requirement in a way that improves the interpretive feedback
available to the DSM.
Most Members and WTO officials proudly view the WTO's
dispute settlement system-and particularly the Dispute Settle-
ment Body-as the most efficient of the WTO bodies.' 4 2 In a
141. Sutherland Report, supra note 24, 1 250.
142. Interview 1.1, supra note 73; Interview 1.3, supra note 76; Interview
2.1, supra note 64; Interview 2.2, supra note 101; Interview 4.5, supra note
102.
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sense, however, the DSB has become a victim of its own suc-
cess, resulting in an almost hyper-efficient body, wherein the
ability to expedite disputes takes precedence over developing
a broader understanding of interpretive developments within
the WTO. By encouraging more Members to engage actively
in dialogue with each other regarding jurisprudential develop-
ments, our proposal seeks to strengthen the deliberative role
of the DSB without undermining its efficient administration of
the DSU. In order to do so, Members need to move away from
using report statements to simply reiterate legal positions
pleaded during the dispute, and should instead proactively use
such statements to engage in a cooperative endeavor with the
DSM to strengthen WTO jurisprudence for the future. The
DSM obviously does not have to decide future disputes based
on views expressed-whether a minority or a majority-but it
should, particularly in light of its fiduciary duties, be aware of
these interpretive preferences and take them into account as
one of the many factors relevant to interpreting the WTO
agreements.
More critically, the interpretive views available to the DSM
should reflect those of the membership as a whole. The hyper-
efficiency of the DSB has left a large number of Members that
rarely use the system with little to no awareness or understand-
ing of what goes on in the "black box" of the DSM.' 43 Similar
to the way that third-party participation has become an impor-
tant avenue for influencing the outcomes of disputes,1 44 We
encourage Members that rarely participate in dispute settle-
ment to reconsider the DSB as a useful platform that may have
an "important effect on the thinking of the AB members and
the panelists for future cases."145
It is important to reiterate that our proposal is not to en-
courage Members to overreach, meddle or interfere with the
judicial bodies of the Organization. The DSM was delegated
independent authority to interpret and clarify WTO rules, and
views expressed in DSB meetings should not in any way be
seen to bind panels or the AB. Any political interference or
direct interaction with the panelists or Appellate Body mem-
bers outside of dispute settlement proceedings would seriously
143. Interview 5.1, supra note 109.
144. See supra note 27, at 474 and accompanying text.
145. Sutherland Report, supra note 24, 1 250.
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undermine the credibility of the system. This does not mean,
however, that indirect deliberative engagement cannot or
should not occur via the official minutes of DSB meetings,
with the sole expectation being that the Members and the
DSM listen to one another. To this end, it is crucial that Mem-
bers understand how more active DSB participation and ex-
pression of views in the context of report adoption might ben-
efit them now and in the future. If Members see the value in
changing their current practices, either individually or jointly,
and perhaps with the institutional support of the Secretariat,
this proposal has a real chance of succeeding.
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